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- Border Transactions of Deposit Money

Ctoss

Banks andthe Issue of Monet

Control
S. O.

I.
Inttoduction
F1-{n.r. are different
I
I-

forms

of

cross-border transacdons and they include ctoss-

border capital flows, globalization

of

financial institutions and globalization

(200f described the degree to which

financial markets. Caruana

Alasbi-

of

capital is moving

across borders as a revolution. He gave the estimated global cross-border capital flows to be

USg9 trillion in 2005 compared with the est-imated US$2.25 trillion

in

factors responsible for the boom
relaxation

of

1997. Among the

cross-border capital flows was the abolition ot

significant restrictions on investors buying assets abroad and controls on

capital inflows in most countries. Globalization
mergers and acquisitions

in recent

in

(\{&A) of

of

financial institutions mainly through

banks and insumnce companies has continued to surge

years. For example ctoss-bordet financial

accounted for less than 1.0 per cent
about 40.0 per cent

of

the value

of

of

M&A at US$0.2 billion, which

the total in 7997, had, risen to US$359.5 billion or

deals in 2006 (Caruana, 2007). About one-quarter

of

of total financial M&A involved
institutions are outside developed counries. The growth in globali'ation and
cross-border financial M&A or 10.0 percentage points

transformation of financial markets has been obsetved to be positively cotrelated with the
globahzauon of financial insdtutions.
The qpe of cross-botder ttansactions tlat is in focus in this paper are:

o

The foray of foreign banks into the Nigerian economy where Nigeria is host to such
subsidiaries

.

of foreign banks; and

The branches and subsidiaries of Nigerian banks in other countries, thus, making
Nigeria the home country.

In all, the four (4) foreign banks in Nigeria are subsidiaries of an off-shore bank from
United States of America (JSA), United Kingdom eI!, South Aftica, and Economic
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West African States (ECO\YAS). Even though Nigeda is a member

ECOWAS, Ecobank Nigeria is a subsidiary

of

of Ecobank Transnational Incorpotated with

head office in Lome, Togo. Among the remaining twenty (20) banks in Nigeria, fourteen(14)

of them have subsidiaries and branches in USA, UK and Africa. Many of these affiliates
subsidiaries as most

of

the host countries do not allow branches

of foreign

are

banks in their

jurisdictions.

As

a

matter

of fact the distinction between foreign

branches and subsidiaries is now blurred

and, henceforth, are referred to as subsidiaries in this paper. The activities

of

these DMBs as

depicted by their deposits and credits will be out main focus. This is particulady so in view
the implications

II.
II.1

of

of deposits and credits for monetary control in an economy.

Stylized Facts on Cross-Bordet BankingActivities in Nigeria

Ownership Structures of Banks

The number of foreign banks in Nigeria, that is, banks in which foreign interestis above 50.0
per cent has come down from eight (8) pre-consolidation
(4)

as at 31"'

December, 2005 to four

post-consolidation. The remaining4 foteign deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria are

Citibank Nigeria Ltd, Ecobank Nigeria Plc, Stznbic IBTC Bank

P1c, and Standard

Charteted

Bank Nigeria Ltd. These banks have vested interest in the activities of the 4 DMBs with
foreign ownership in excess

of

50.0 per cent as there are other eleven (11) DMBs in the

country with pockets of foreign ownership ranging from 0.04 per cent to 25.07 per ceflt in
2007.

In contrast, the number of Nigerian DMBs with foreign subsidiaries increased from eight
(8) out

of

81 wholly Nigerian DMBs pre-consolidation to fourteen (14) out

of

20 wholly

Nigerian DMBs post-consolidation. As a matter of fact Nigerian DMBs appeared to have
shifted competition to foreign land particulady the Vest African sub-region. The vogue in

of foreign subsidiaries. It
Nigerian DMBs increased

the Nigerian banking industry at present appears to be ownership

is, therefore, not surprising that foreign subsidiaries of
significantly from eight (8) as at 31" December, 2005 to 41as at 31"'December, 2008. Put
differendy, 14 Nigerian DMBs had 41 foreign subsidiaries as at 31 "' December, 2008. It
should be noted that the number of foreign subsidiaries of Nigerian DMBS was 8 in 2006
and 18 in 2007.
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FactorsthatlnfluencedCross-BorderActivities

We would consider some

of the factors that

have influenced foreign DMBs to come to

Nigeria and those that have driven Nigerian DMBs to have foteign subsidiaries. The factors
have been listed belowbut not in any particular order.

(")

Direct investment by other developing country banks tends to be driven by
economic integration, common language and proximity. This pardy explains the
prominence of cross-border transactions of Nigerian DMBs in West Africa in view of the
anticipated second monetary zone involving mainly the English-speaking West African

countries and tlre prospects

(b)

of a

single monetary zone

in

ECO'S7AS

in

futue.

The increased cross-border economic activity in both financial and non-inancial

of banks.Just as this used to be
the main factor that led to the infiltration of foreign banks into Nigeria, it has propelled
markets has also continued to fuel cross-border acquisition

many Nigerian DMBs to have subsidiaries particularly in the West African sub-region and

London. For example, some companies with substantial Nigerian interest have relocated
partially or firlly to some othet Vest African countries from Nigeria despite the fact that
Nigeria remains their dominant market.

G)

Cross-border expansion

of DMBs to

emerging markets (developing and

underdeveloped countries) is being influenced by the prospects

of faster business and ptofit
their financial markets and

grovth, especially given the relative underdevelopment of
institutions. The rush of Nigerian DMBs to other ECOWAS countries is principally driven
by this reason. By 2009, there are likely to be more subsidiaries of Nigerian DMBs in The
Gambia and Sierra-I-eone.

(d)

According to IMF (2007, Chapter 111), some DMBs have internationalised based

on expectations that knowledge and efficiencies in undertaking business and risk in one
market can be ttansferred into others; that economies of scale and scope can be ach.ieved

when carying out multi country operations; and that a cross-border group can better
allocate a large and sable capital resources profiably across business lines to those where

profitability is expected to be greatest, while also divetsifying risk geographically. The
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the banking sector consolidation in Nigeria made many DMBs to have the

perception that they had excess capital which could be judiciously utilised for sustainable
and improved return on capital. That notion had driven many

opportunities outside Nigeria with

of their nominal

a

of them to explore

business

view to enhancing their performances. The mere size

capital visa-vis limited expansion opportunities coupled with heightened

competition in Nigeria and prospects of higher profit in the host countries lured them into
foteign countries.

(.)

Advancement in information and communications technology (ICT) has increased

cross-border banking transactions. Berger, et al(2003) discovered that technological
innovations in risk management, back-office support, and transaction processing have
enabled banks and other institutions to manage risks at lower cost without geographic

proximity to the customers. Many banks have taken tdvantage

of ICT to

diversi$, into

foreign countries.

III.

Analysis of Balance Sheet Structure of Deposit Money Banks with Foreign
Subsidiaries

The task here is to review the activities

of

foreign DMBs in Nigeria and the activities

of

Nigerian DMBs with foreign subsidiaries. The second legof the review would have been the
review

of the activities of foreign DMBs in their home countries and those of Nigerian

DMBs in theithost countries. Howeve! due to paucity of data, this second aspect cannot be
undertaken here. The essence

of

the review

subsidiaries is to appreciate the significance

of

the activities

of

DMBs with foreign

of their effects on monetary control in the

home and host countries.

The basic parameters we have consideted ftom their balance sheet in this review are total
assets, credits and deposits. Even though the share

of foreign DMBs'

assets in total assets

of

the Nigerian banking sector more than doubled from 3.4 per cent pre-consolidation to 7 per

cent post-consolidation, the proportiofl does not appear significant to warrant banking
crisis in Nigeria in the event

of any disruption to their activities

(see

Table 1). Similarly, their

in total credits at 6.1 per cent and total deposits at 5.7 per cent as at 306 June, 2009
make them fringe players in the Nigerian banking market. The effect of risk of failure on the
share
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economy either due to their activities in their home country or within Nigeda appears mild
on the Nigerian banking sector and the economy.

Table

1:

Actiwities of Foreign DMBs in Nigeda

Total for all DMBs

TyP.

Forcign DMBs (Nbn)

(NBn)

31/12/05

Proportion in Total
for all DMB6 (%)

30/n6/6 31/t2/05 Ar/06/09

3t/ 12/0s

30/06/@

Asses

tr.

14,8M-2

184.8

1,03t.0

3.4

7.0

Crcdits

1,818.7

'7,671.7

62.O

466.5

3.4

6.1

Dcposits

2469.1

&746.1

124.5

499.O

5.0

5.7

The actirities of the Nigerian DMBs with foreign subsidiaries at home are very dominant in
the three parameters. They accounted for 35 per cent, 34.8 per cent and 50 per cent
assets, credits and deposits

of total

pre-consolidation and galloped to a share of 82.4 pet cent,82.7

per cent ar,d 82.2 per cent of total assets, credits and deposits post-consolidation,
respectively (see Table 2). In effect, their activities could be closely m.'nitored at home and
in their host countries in view of the adverse effects their failutes could cause the Nigedan
economy. The adverse effect of the distressed condition of six (6) of these banks on the
Nigerian economy is still vety fresh. Even though thete was nothing to suggest that their
problems were caused by their foreign subsidi4des but

i_t

il_.Ij:1,

that the activities of

Exl been known to cause the failures of paient banks. See the
Appendix lifted ftom IMF (200| for the familiar examples of banks that collapsed due to
some foreign subsitlianei

the activities

of their foteign subsidiaries.

Table 2: Activities of Nigerian DMBs with Foreign Subsidiaries

Typ.

Total for all DMBs Nigerian DMBs with Proportion in Total
(NBn)
Foreign Subsidiaties forAll DMBs (%)
(t

{8")

31/12/05

Arsets
Crcdits
Dcgrsits

5,445.3

14,t104.2

'1,908.0

12,198.0

35.0

824

1,818.7

7,671.7

(,33.3

(,.345.0

34.8

821

2,46().1

8,74(r.l

1,2+6.8

,1&).4

50.5

822

'7

60

IV.

Central Bank of

Nigeria

Economic qnd Financial

Review

Volume

47/4

December 2009

Ctoss-BotderTransactions and Implications for Monetary Control

Banks through their activities provide fundamental services to the economy and yet they can
experience bank runs. There are various problems in a parent bank that can easily spread to

foreign subsidiaries and vice versa and, therefore, contagion risk is a realiqr Contqgion risk
can even be more serious in banking activities as problems in one bank can easily spread to

other banks within the same coutt-ry and even banks in other jurisdictions. The global
financial crisis

of 2007 2009,wlttch

was tdggered by the high rate

of default in sub-prime

mortgage loans, is a classical example of contagion.

There appears to be a consensus in the literature that the impact of cross-border activities

of

DMBs on global financial stability is mixed. While it is established that it has helped to
imptove financial stabil.iry IMF (2007) observed that an increase in international linkages
within and across institutions may make crisis more broad-ranging and compl.icated to deal
wit}l. According to Gieve (2006), financial systems may now be more efficient at sharing risk
but also at transmitting shocks. In orderwords, crisis maybe less common but more severe.

Despite all these, banking regulation for safety and soundness and economic stability is
essentially a national affair. The concetn

of

policyrnakers on the cross-border activities

DMBs is, therefore, understandable in view

of

of

their effects on monetary control and

economic stability. This probably iaform€dthe st4lgment credited to Sanusi Lamido Sanusi,

CBN Goveinor (2009) that he would meet with African Central Bankers at the IMF
Conference in October 2009 to find away to build

He was quoted to have said:

"I

a

regulatory framework fot the continent.

am concerned that we have got banks that are spreading

across d.iffetent African countries and while vre sign MoUs with other regulators, we don't

have an African framework for cross-border supervision". He went on,

"I

think the

Nigerians, the South Africans, the Ghanaians, the BCEAO (West African Central Bank for
French-speaking Countries), the Central A&ican regulators can together build a framewotk
that makes sute all banks that operate any',Jvhere in Africa ate closely tegulated." According

to him, Nigerian banks have subsidiaries spread across Africa and that poses ffedit and
market riskas well

as

risk to the reputation of the counry's banking industry

as a

whole.

The teputational riskis even very highly significant given the initial reaction of customers

of

foreign subsidiarie s of Nigerian DMBs during the recent banking reform in Nigeria. Many

Alashi: Cross-Border Trunsactions ofDeposit Money Banls and the Issue ofMonetary
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these customers were apprehensive that all Nigerian banks were disttessed and should

not be patronised. Of course, t}re outcome of the refotm exposed the 10 distressed DMBs
in Nigeria and we are living wimesses to the ptoactive measure of the CBN in bailing eight

of them out with N620 billion. That spontaneous action allayed their fears and made the
foreign subsidiaries of the affected DMBs to avertlosses due to reputational risk. As part of
efforts to stave off reputational risk from foreign subsidiaries of Nigerian DMBs, the CBN
Governor had started visiting Governors of Cenral Banks where Nigerian DMBs have
subsidiaries. He already visited the Governor of the Bank of Siera kone where thete are at
(8)

of Nigerian DMBs. Given

least nine (9) subsidiaries

encapsulated some issues

these background information, we have

fot monetary control in both home country (l.ligeria) and host

countries in ensuing sub-parts.

IV.1

L,evelof Credit

The level of credit targeted for the economy necessary for the anticipated level of gtowth
and development in a particular year affects the control

of money

by the central bank. The

DMBs with foreign subsidiaries are mandatorily required to consolidate their balance sheet
and, therefore, the level

of

credit is for the home and host countries. However, it is easy to

sepatate the credit for the home

counry from the consoli&ted credit in the balance sheet.

Even at that, can we categodcally

say

that the level of credit in the books of Nigerian DMBs

for the home country is real?

Given the possibility that

a

parent bank can extend credit in Nigeria and for such ctedit to be

pardy or fully utilised in another country where the bank has foreign subsidiaries, it thus
implies that it will be difficult to know the quantum

of credit utilised in Nigeria. The DMB

may not even know that the credit will not be utilised within Nigeria. Fot example, Unilever

Nigeria Plc can access credit in Nigeria and since it has factories in Ghana, such credit can
partly be used in Ghana. In essence, it will be erroneous to think that the whole facility
bortowed from a DMB within Nigeria in favour of Unilevet Nigeria Plc is utilised in Nigeria.

In the

same maoner, Unilever

in Ghana can obtain credit from subsidiaries of Nigerian

DMBs in Ghana and utilise part of such credit in Nigeria. It was even teported that some
directors

of a Nigerian DMBs went and

obtained credit in their Ghanaian subsidiary. Such

credit can easily be utilised pardy or wholly in Nigeria.
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Given such information as).nnmetry, monetary control will be a problem both in the home
country and host countries. I-et us consider the scenario where the CBN has estimated that
credit growth in Nigeria is targeted at x per cent on the basis

of which the level of money

supply is premised. Assume that the grovth is actually x per cent based on the balance sheet
figutes, but in reality, the gror*'th is either (x+a) per cent or (x-b) per cent as part

of the credit

meant for the host countries has been diverted to Nigeria or credit in Nigeria is diverted to
the host countries without the knowledge

of

the DMBs with foreign subsidiaries. Such

a

distortion will make mofley stock nece ssary fot monetary and price stability to be difficult to
determine.

Also, in a situation where DMBs with foreign subsidiaries are confronted with problems to
the extent that they carmot lend in their home country, they are likely to raise their level

of

credit in their host countries. Such host counries may not have the capacity to absorb such
level

of credit thus precipitating high credit default. Meanwhile, money control in such host

countries v/ill be difficult

as they never envisaged such a level

of credit. At the

same time, the

home country will experience credit ctunch which can destabilise the economy.

Similarly, econom.ic downturn in host countries can lead to

home country beyond the level

l\1.2

is very

(diversion)

of credit required for the anticipated

activity. The implication for monetary

of situation

a deluge

level

of credit to

of

economic

conrol in both home and host countries in this type

apparent.

Money Laundering

The conttol

of money will no doubt

be affected adversely in both home and host countries

whete money laundering is involved. Money laundering has implications for monetary

control in home country and host countries

of DMBs

involved in money laundering.

Whether the money is laundered through the parent bank to the subsidiary(ies) or thtough
foreign subsidiary(ies) to the parent bank, monetary control in the countries involved will be
affected. The parent bank and its foreign subsidiaries may not even be involved directly, but

they should be able to identi$, such customers through effective customer due diligence
(CDD) and Know Your Customers (KYC) principles.
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Foreign subsidiaries of Nigerian DMBs involved in money launderingmay not even need to
launder such funds into Nigeria fot monetary
discovered that such foreign subsidiaries

conrol to be affected in Nigeda. Once it is

of Nigerian DMBs

are being used to launder funds

reputational risk that can adversely affect the country's image internationally will easily set

in. The

outcome

will

definitely affect monetary control

in

Nigeria given the

interdependence between nations.

ry.3

Rendition of False Retrrns

to render false information to the regulatory authorities. The
ownership of foreign subsidiaries by such DMBs will make it easier for them to hide
information on their activities particulady the level of their deposits and credits. Rendition
Some DMBs are known

of

false teturns adversely affects the banking system and the economy given the credibility

problems associated with it.

In a situation where unreliable information is available to

central banks, monetary policy will be based on such unrealistic figures and may not be
effective. This is likely to be so in the home country and host countty(ies) of the DMBs.

IV.4

InformalTrade

Infotmal trade between countries has been a major factor that makes it difficult for the level

of

money supply to be determined precisely. The existence

of

foreign subsidiades in

countries involved in infotmal trade is expected to bring such transactions into formal trade

thtough banks and enhance government revenue

in both home country and

host

country(ies).

IV.5

Policy Change in Host Countries

Possibilities

of a policy

change in some host countries that would affect the parent DMBs

cannot be ruled out. Following the perceived success

of banking consolidation in Nigeria,

some countries in Africa had increased or contemplated increasing the minimum capital

of

DMBs in their jurisdictions. In some counffies like Ghana, the minimum capital
requifement of a foreign DMB is higher than those of DMBs owned by indigenes. No
doubt some of these countries could use the policy of capital increase as a means to attract
foreign ditect investment. Such a policy would not only deplete the capital of the parent
DMBs but also would have implications for monetary controlin the home country.

'Tfri,frF*
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of Nigerian DMBs in countries like Ghana,

Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and the United Kingdom a substantial increase in the minimum

capital requirement in any

of

them would engender capita.l flight from Nigeria. Such

capital outflow vould weaken the performance

our money supply especially
Nigeria. Let us not reason

if

tlat

of

a

the affected DMBs in Nigeria and affect

the notice for the change is short as it was also the case in

many

of these countries would not contemplate

such

a

policy

at the same time. The bandwagon effect that followed banking consolidation in Nigeria

should be a pointer that many countries can embark on such a measure within a short
period. For example, the recent banking reform in Nigeria could be copied by some

of

the

sub-Sahara African countries where Nigerian DMBs have foreign subsidiaries. Rathet than

their own cental bank bailing out all DMBs with capital and/or liquidity shortfall, foreign
banks could be asked to shore up their own capital and/or liquidity. The implication

of such

policy for monetary control in the home countryis apparent.

IV.6

State of Cotpotate Governance

With the benefit of hindsight, we can affirm that a DMB with poor corporate governance
will inevitably face crisis either in the shot run or long run. In e ffect, Nigerian DMBs with
poor corporate governance would export such poor corporate governance to their foreign
subsidiaries which could ultimately face cdsis. The weak financial position

of

foreign

of Nigerian DMBs would have implications for money supply in Nigeria and
host countries. Imagine if the eight (8) distressed DMBs recendy bailed out with N620

subsidiaries
their

billion by the CBN were foreign DMBs. The CBN measure would likely be different to the
extent t}lat monetary conttol
affected

V.

as

of home countries of

such distressed foreign DMBs would be

it would be in the host countty, Nigeria.

Conclusion

The panacea to monetary instability due to the activities of DMBs with foreign subsidiaries

that \ve want to consider are basically two. We believe that

if

the monetary authority in

Nigeria can address them, then the activities of Nigerian DMBs with foreign subsidiaries

will not likely have adverse effects on monetary control. Before

a

Nigerian DMB is allowed

to have a foreign subsidiary in another country, t}le regulatory authority in the prospective
host country should seek the consent of the CBN, the aPex regulatory authority of financial
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instirutions in Nigeria. Our recommendation in this respect is that before such consent is
given in futute, such a Nigerian DMB should have sound corporate governance. Any
Nigerian DMB with poor corporate governance no matter its sound financial condition and
size should not be allowed to.have foreign subsidiaries. This is our clarion call to the CBN

which we hope on implementation will make for

a

more potent monetary control measutes.

Since each national regulatory authority has an overriding tole to play

in ensuring that

DMBs are regulated for safety and soundness and for economic stability, the CBN should
not allow Nigerian DMBs to own subsidiaries in countries with weak regulatory regime.
This is particulady so as the CBN will have to relv on such national repglatory authorities for
effective regulation and supervision of subsidiaries of Nigerian DMBs in their jurisdictions,

tlnt, consolidated supervision across-borders may not materialise in the short run.
It is even easy for the CBN to easily know countries that do not meet its minimum
regulatory standards. Any country that has not complied substantially with the Core
Principles fot Effective Banking Supervision as enunciated by the Basle Committee of
moreso

Banking Supervisors should not be allowed to host subsidiades of Nigerian DMBs.

Among the main goals for supervising DMBs, apart from the primary goal of protection
depositors, are fot the implementation

of

monetary policy for protection

of

of

the economy

from the vagaries of the banking system, and to ensure that they play their proper role in
economic development. Cross-border transacdons of DMBs can make the realisation
these goals elusive given their adverse effects on monetary control

regulated.

if

of

they are not effectively
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Appendix
Examples of Bank Failures with Cross-Border Dirnensions

[Ierstatt Bank
The bank was closed down by the (Vest) German authorities in

197

4 after dtey found out

that it was insolvent (due mainly to large losses in the foreign exchange market).The action
was taken after the European markets had closed for the day, but while New York was still

of foreign exchange deals had been settled, but once news of the
closure reached New York all trades involving Herstatt v/ere suspended, so that
open. The European leg

counterparties already debited in Europe did not receive the corresponding dollar amounts
due to them in

NewYork. As noted by Latter (1999), this episode prompted central banks to

pay much more attention to iei'Jcment risk in payments procedures, particulady in ctoss-

border foreign exchange transactions.

Bank of Credit and Commerce Intetnational

(Bccr)
The closute of BCCI in 1991 tanks among the biggest single-bank failutes. Atthe time of its
collapse, BCCI was operating in more than 70 jurisdictions.

It had lost money on lending
operations and foteign currency dealing!, and failed owing mote than $18 billion to its
creditors. BCCI was made up

of

layers

of

entities, linked through a complex series

holding companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, and other relationships. The BCCI

of

case

highlighted the challenges involved in cross-border failures. For example, the different
treatment

of set-off

led to problems in the BCCI liquidation, in which Luxembourg law

differed from that in the United Kingdom, leading to the differential treatrnent of creditors
(Campbell,2002). However, the contagious impact

of BCCI's failute on otler

banks was

limited (IQnas,2004).

Barings
An institution u,ith roots going

ba ck233

yeats,Banngs suffered

a

91.3 billion tradingloss

in

February 1995. The event was precipitated by a Singapore-based tradet who eventually
pleaded guilty to two counts

of fraud

and was sentenced to a six-year jail term. The loss was

larget than the bank's entire capital base and reserves. Barings was fotced to declare
bankruptcy and was later purchased by the Dutchbank ING fot f,7 , md an agreement to
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